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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW-1953
convey the property to the vendor, was legally ineffective. Consequently,
tide to the property was no longer in the vendor at the time of the-exercise
of the option and the specific performance action, and therefore specific per-
formance was impossible.
In Back v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co.,4 the plaintiff had purchased certain land.
He now brings an action to quiet tide, claiming that he is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value as to defendanes claim which arose out of an instrument
given by plaintiff's predecessor in tide which was in the general form of a
deed but conveyed to defendant the oil and gas in and under the land, with
the right of operating upon the land to obtain such oil and gas. Defendant
recorded the instrument in the record of *leases and claims that such act
gave plaintiff constructive notice. The court, accepting the defendant's ar-
gument, rejected plaintiff's claim that it was a deed and that he did not have
constructive notice in that it was not recorded in the record of deeds.
One specific performance action growing out of a contract of employ-
ment should be noted. In Masetta v. Nat. Bronze & Aluminum Foundry
Co.," the supreme court held, in a class suit by a discharged employee for
himself and others similarly situated, that a mandatory injunction would
not be granted to specifically enforce an employment contract made as the
result of collective bargaining for the purpose of causing reemployment of
the discharged employees. Although it is recognized that an employer can-
not obtain an order from equity to require an employee to work, it is un-
fortunate that the court used the discredited mutuality of remedy doctrine
as a partial basis for the decision in the present case. The result could have
been reached independently of that doctrine.
EDGAR I. KING
EVIDENCE
Two Issue Rule
It has long been the rule in Ohio that in a civil case, where the issues
are such that a finding on either of them in favor of the successful party
entitles him to a judgment rendered on the general verdict, such judgment
will not be reversed for error in instructions of the court relating exclusively
192 Ohio App. 324, 110 N.E.2d 9 (1951).
'Id. at 328, 110 NXE.2d at 11.
'63 Ohio L. Abs. 293, 109 N.E.2d 549 (App. 1951)
160 Ohio St. 81, 113 N.E.2d 865 (1953).
159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d 15 (1953).
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to the other issueY This is the well-known two-issue rule.2 InSt.te v. John-
son,8 the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County held that the two-ssue rule
has no application in crzmunaI cases, and an error prejudicial to the rights of
the defendant committed in submitting one of the issues presented to the
jury requires reversal of the judgment of conviction.
Misconduct of Juror
In Peart v. Jones,4 the plaintiff recovered a substantial verdict in a civil
action for assault and battery. At the hearing of defendant's motion for
a new trial, it appeared that one of the jurors was offered a bribe by a third
person if she would cast her vote for the plaintiff for the full amount he
was asking. The juror did not report the incident to the trial judge until
several days after the verdict was rendered. She was one of the nine who
signed the verdict, but, in an affidavit signed by her, she stated that the
attempt to bribe her did not in any way affect or influence her duty as a
juror. The trial judge overruled defendant's motion and judgment was
entered for the plaintiff. This was affirmed by the court of appeals. The
Ohio Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for
new trial. The basic and underlying principle of the right of trial by jury
is that such trial shall be heard and determined by a jury of persons com-
pletely unbiased and uninfluenced by extrinsic considerations. The court
rejected the argument that a new trial should be denied since the evidence
was so overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff that a bribe could 'have had
no effect, and stressed the point that if a bribe has been offered it is im-
possible to determine at a later time whether the verdict was influenced
thereby.
Privilege: Records of City Police Department
In re Story" was an action originally instituted in the Court of Appeals
of Cuyahoga County in which a writ of habeas corpus was sought to dis-
charge petitioner from custody of the sheriff. Petitioner was the chief of
the police department of Cleveland. He was held in custody pursuant to an
order of a notary public for refusal to produce any part of certain records
which-were described in a subpoena duces tecum. This had been served
upon hun in connection with the taking of a deposition in a civil action
brought by-the administrator of a decedent against two police officers for
'Ochsner v. Traction Co., 107 Ohio St. 33, 140 N.E. 644 (1923).
' First announced in Sites v. Haverstick, 23 Ohio St. 626 (1873).
64 Ohio L. Abs. 425, 112 N.E.2d 62 (App. 1952).
'159 Ohio St. 137, 111 N.E.2d 16 (1953).
'159 Ohio St. 485, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953), 5 WET. RES. L REv. 111 (1954).
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damages for. the wrongful death. of such decedent claimed to have been
caused by the two police officers.of the City of Cleveland. Those. officers,
at the time of the shooting of the decedents, had been engaged. in a search
for another party suspected as a bank robber. It was conceded that the city
was immune from any suit on account of the death of the decedent. The
city's attorneys, however, were defending the two policemen in the civil
action and all of the records had either been turned over to, or were. made
available to, those attorneys for aid in defending that action. The court of
appeals discharged the petioner from custody and the case was taken to the
supreme court on appeal as a matter of right. The sole question was whether
the petitioner, having custody and control of the records of the police depart-
ment, made for the detection and prevention of crime, was generally privi-
leged from disclosing the records upon the taking of a deposition in a civil
suit. The court held that such records were not privileged; that no protec-
tion of the public or other compelling reason was shown to justify a different
rule with respect to this evidence in possession of the city and its chief of
police from that with respect to similar evidence in the possession of any
other individual or corporation. The court pointed out its decisions con-
struing the attorney-dient privilege were not applicable to the facts of this
case.
Physician-Patient Privilege
In Strizak v. Industril Comm'n,6 the plaintiff sought compensation for
an alleged injury to his eye. At the trial, the plaintiff testified fully to the
cause, nature and results of his injury. A physician also gave testimony
favorable to his claim. The defendant called as a witness in its behalf a
physician whom, previously, the plaintiff had consulted professionally con-
cerning the condition of his eye. The defendant sought to examine the
witness, not as the attending physician, but solely as an expert witness to
testify in answer to a hypothetical question based on an assumed state of
facts. The witness clearly understood that his opinion was not to be based
on any matters confided to him by his former patient, or on information
acquired by him while attending his patient in his professional capacity.
Over objection by the plaintiff, on the ground that the opinion elicited-by
the question would be violative of the privileged communications statute,'
the trial court permitted the witness to answer the question. The jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant:and judgment was entered thereon. This
was reversed by the court of.appeals. In reversing this ojudgment and af-
firming that of the trial court, the supreme court held that the opinion
'159 Ohio St. 475, 112 N.B.2d 537 (1953).
*O{Io REv. Cons S 2317.02 (OO GEN. CobE 5 11494).
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